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a b s t r a c t
The current mobility system, dominated by fossil fuel powered
automobiles, is under increasing pressure due to its environmen-
tal impact. To address this issue there is a need for a transition
of the system towards one that is more sustainable, including the
introduction of car technologies that allow a decrease in fuel con-
sumption and the substitution of fossil fuels as primary energy
source. Due to the stability of the current automotive industry
and the dominance of the internal combustion engine technology,
it is expected that the incumbent ﬁrms and their activities will
play a crucial role in the transition. Policy makers have therefore
introducedavariety of policies to encourage the industry toprovide
suitable solutions.Wehaveconductedamicro-level analysisofhow
the threemainGermancarmanufacturershavechanged their activ-
ities in the ﬁeld of low emission vehicle technologies in response to
national/international events and policy making. Our analysis sug-
gests that policy makers only have limited inﬂuence on the type
of disruptive solution that is chosen by these individual companies
and that activities related to solutions that were not familiar to the
individual car manufacturer were mainly induced by internal or
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external champions. Still, while the existence of regulatory policies
allowed such activities to succeed, on its own it only encouraged the
industry to work on incremental solutions based upon the knowl-
edge already possessed.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Over the last few decades the automotive regime has been experiencing a number of challenges,
both changing customer expectations andneeds, particularly their perceptionof oil supplyuncertainty
and price volatility, and also governmental and regional policies driven by climate change and local air
quality issues.Asautomobiles are responsible for a large fractionof total energy-relatedGHGemissions
(IEA, 2010; WEC, 2011) the on-going discussions on fuel efﬁciency and emission reduction goals has
led, and will lead, to changes in behaviour, strategies and products in the automotive industry.
One way of addressing these pressures is the introduction of technologies such as hybrid, battery
and fuel cell electric vehicles (Howey and Martinez-Botas, 2010; IEA, 2010; Offer et al., 2010). It is
argued that the whole spectrum of electric vehicle technologies is likely to be needed in a future
decarbonised road transport system, each playing a different role (Contestabile et al., 2011; IEA, 2010;
McKinsey&Company, 2010). As a result scenarios, such as those analysed by the IEA andWorld Energy
Council, areused tohighlight futureswith adiffusionof thosedifferent vehiclepropulsion technologies
that may lead to the change of whole socio-technical systems (IEA, 2010; Vallejo et al., 2013; WEC,
2011). Hence the diffusion of a new vehicle propulsion technology is potentially a complex systemic
problem, subject to issues such as technology lock-ins (Unruh, 2000, 2002).
While policy makers have tried to create policies leading to futures that are favourable for their
countries, economies and citizens, the response of the system is not always as expected. And even now
in the current transition towards electric cars the diffusion of low emission vehicles is not happening
as fast as it was aimed for by policy makers. This can be explained by the stability of the system
and especially the role of the automotive industry that is strongly embedded in the current private
car transport regime (Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2012). Because of that stability we assume that the
change towards electric cars will happen at least with the participation of the current incumbent
automotive manufacturers, if not even be executed entirely by them. Even in the case of the electric
vehicle manufacturer Tesla we would argue that it is actually an ‘offspring’ of the existing automotive
regime, as it strongly relies on an employee base that has been hired from the automotive industry
regime except for the engine engineers. Additionally they take advantage of the existing automotive
supply chains. Using the typologyof stereotypic historical transitionpathways (Geels andSchot, 2007),
this would imply a transformation or a reconﬁguration pathway where the current regime players –
namely the automotive industry – still play an important role in a future regimewhere electric vehicles
dominate (Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2012). Hence as a result this paper focuses on a transition towards
electric vehicles that is executed by the existing automotive industry. This is conﬁrmed by the fact that
this industry has presented different types of low emission vehicles in the past. Not only have there
been a vast number of low emission vehicles in the past, such as the electric EV-1 by GM in 1996 and
the fuel cell vehicle Necar by Daimler in 1994 to name two early ones. But recently we are observing
the introduction of various low emission vehicles into the mass market, such as the Tesla S by Tesla
Motors, the i3 by BMW, the Leaf by Nissan or, before that, the Prius hybrid vehicle by Toyota.
A number of studies (Bakker and Farla, 2015; Bakker et al., 2012a,b, Geels, 2012; Köhler et al., 2013;
Mazur et al., 2015; Wiesenthal et al., 2010) have emphasised the strong role of policy in leading to
this development. Other studies (Farla et al., 2012; Mazur et al., 2015; Penna and Geels, 2012; Wells
and Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Wesseling et al., 2013) have also emphasised the importance of the existing
automotive industry in delivering this transition, implying that the understanding of the micro-level
activities of this industry is crucial if policy makers are intending to design policies that are able to
deliver the desired environmental objectives.
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To understand what events have particularly inﬂuenced the automotive industry’s activities
regarding vehicle ﬂeet emission reduction technology, we have conducted a study of the micro-level
activities of the German car manufacturers, linking these with historical events at the regime and
landscape level. The goal is to identify patterns in the companies’ behaviour.
2. Methodology
2.1. Analytical framework
In order to analyse the behaviour of the automotive industry in response to various types of events
and pressures, we have developed the framework illustrated in Fig. 1. We have built upon method-
ologies from a number of studies (Budde et al., 2012; Konrad et al., 2012) addressing the effects of
expectations on strategy and micro-level activities within the industry. Moreover, the framework’s
structure is basedupon themulti-level perspective on socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2005; Rip and
Kemp, 1998) that differentiates between landscape, regime and niche levels, and describes transitions
as the result of interactions between these levels. In our framework the activities of the automo-
tive industry are put in relation to events on the regime and landscape level – this can also include
expectations.
The framework is then used as a basis to create narratives on the industry as commonly done in
previous research (Augenstein, 2015; Budde et al., 2012; Konrad et al., 2012; Nykvist and Nilsson,
2015) addressing the role of the automotive industry in sustainability transitions.
We focus our analysis on the three main car manufacturers in Germany (Daimler, BMW, Volk-
swagen). They are part of the current regime and conduct different activities in order to respond to
company external pressures. These activities are differentiated in the framework between (1) strat-
egy decisions and announcements, (2) research and development activities as well as introduction
of efﬁciency improvement technologies, and the (3) collaboration with other companies in these
domains.
acvies of car 
manufacturers
1990 2014
strategy decisions and announcements
collaboraons
regime
landscape
Regulaons, competors, customers, etc.
Climate change, resources, global 
economy, crises, etc.
me
micro-level
What external triggers inﬂuence acvies at the micro level?
What
internal
triggers?
Niches
(technologies/soluons)
Baery or Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle 
technologies, Lightweight materials, Car 
sharing etc.
What events made the car manufacturers work on niches?
technology R&D, concepts and car introducons
Fig. 1. Overview of analytical framework (based upon Budde et al., 2012 and Konrad et al., 2012). (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this sentence, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
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Strategy decisions and announcements include new, revised or abandoned technology targets for
the achievement of efﬁciency improvements and related sales targets. Technology related activities
can include launches, changes or discontinuation of certain technologies, establishing a new research
group, presenting a prototype and launching a vehicle on the market. Finally, collaboration activities
include instances where new collaborations are set up or cancelled, companies acquired or external
actors approached the company.
These activities are then put into relation with events on the regime and landscape level. For this
to be possible, the framework needs to also cover the regime and landscape around the incumbent
players and their evolution over time. In particular, the landscape level focuses on aspects such as
economic development, fuel prices and climate change pressures, while the regime level illustrates
international and national policies, and consumer’s and competitors’ behaviour, similar to past studies
(Budde et al., 2012) conducted in this ﬁeld.
In addition to the above, the niche level offers a possible pool of alternative and disruptive solutions
to the organisations. In certain cases the car manufacturers can interact with these technology niches,
meaning that they can conduct activities that have the aim to internalise these disruptive solutions.
Alternatively they can respond to pressure by just introducing incremental improvements.
This study aims to identify what events on the landscape and regime level, and on the micro-level,
encouraged the car manufacturers to internalise these niches (see red arrows in Fig. 1).
2.2. Design of the study
In order to conduct the study, ﬁrst an extensive reviewof the literature on themicro-level activities
as well as on events that occurred on the landscape and regime level since 1990 was conducted.
The type of information collected was deﬁned by the analytical framework and focused on activities
relevant to the reduction of ﬂeet emissions. The information gathered was then used to build a set
of historical timelines that are presented in Section 2.3; the set consists of one timeline showing
major events on landscape and regime levels in which the car manufacturers are embedded, and three
micro-level timelines, one for each German car manufacturer studied. The content of the timelines
are motivated by the analytical framework and so constructed allow the comparative study of three
companies that are all in the same environment and are all affected by the same company external
events.
To this end, we then conducted an analysis where the timeline for each car manufacturer was
examined for signiﬁcant changes in theﬁrm’s activities,with a focuson those activities involvingmajor
interactions with niche solutions. Once this was done the landscape/regime timeline was examined
for events that had occurred during or before this activity, in order to ﬁnd potential causal links
between the landscape/regime timeline and the car manufacturer’s. The focus was put on activities
such as research, development and commercialisation of technologies and solutions that contributed
to lower emissions.
Based upon this approach a narrative for each car manufacturer is created and presented in
Section 3.
2.3. Data
Alike similar studies (Budde et al., 2012; Konrad et al., 2012; Wesseling et al., 2013) that looked at
the behaviour of the automotive industry, the data needed for our study are obtained using a mixture
ofmethods, including an extensive review and analysis of scientiﬁc literature and discourses, and then
validated through interactionswith industry experts. As alreadyoutlinedbyother studies (Buddeet al.,
2012) such a meticulous approach is necessary, as the automotive industry normally does not disclose
the reasons for their activities.
Initially we reviewed the literature (Bakker and Budde, 2012; Bakker et al., 2012a,b; Budde et al.,
2012; Collantes and Sperling, 2008; Dijk and Yarime, 2010; Hacker et al., 2009; IEA, 2012; Köhler et al.,
2013; Konrad et al., 2012; Mazur et al., 2015; Wesseling et al., 2013, 2014) that provides insights into
strategies andactivities, technology trends andhypes, national and international policies, competitors’
behaviours, economic pressures, fuel prices and infrastructures, and future expectations.
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Subsequently we executed a discourse analysis of coverage in the mass media,1 screening our
selected sources for information on vehicle releases, strategic decisions and collaborations. For our
analysis we selected those articles containing keywords such as “electric vehicle”, “hybrid”, “concept
vehicle”, “fuel cell”, “battery”, etc. and those that dealt with major vehicle exhibitions such as the
events held in Detroit, Geneva, Paris or Frankfurt.
Finally, annual reports of the three German car manufacturers were screened for information on
vehicles releases, strategy decisions and low emission technologies. Here the environmental sections
often offered insights into what technology solutions were preferred at given times.
The data above has been gathered for each year of the observed period of 1990–2014 and put into
the timelines (see Figs. 3–8).
The timelines were presented at conferences attended by representatives of the automotive indus-
try and were also – in private – discussed with experts.2 This provided a form of validation of the data
gathered and of the main causal relationships that we had derived from it; the latter is particularly
important as the review of the literature and discourses we carried out does not in itself guarantee
the validity of the causal relationships inferred.
In the following section,weprovide simpliﬁedversionsof the timelines abovewherewesummarise
the main disruptive events that led the car manufacturers to work on niche solutions.
3. Analysis
In the following a number of cases are outlined where various car manufacturers interact with
niche technologies and solutions; these are put in relation with pressures the companies experienced
at the time. In the analysis of the timelines, particular attention is paid to cases where companies
have decided to do something new – something that went beyond their past technology path. This
means that while continuous improvements in domains where the companies had already extensive
knowledge, including efﬁciency improvements in combustion engines, are also discussed, the focus is
put on events that led to the work on technologies that were step changes for the company. Following
the analytical approach described, disruptive events were identiﬁed and then put in relation with
changes at the regime and landscape level, in order to identify possible causal relationships.
In the following sectionswe provide narratives of the temporal evolution of the automotive regime
and landscape in which the car manufacturers are embedded (see Fig. 2) and of the micro-level
activities of the three main German car manufacturers.
3.1. The automotive regime and the landscape
The Zero EmissionsVehicle (ZEV) initiative in California in 1990was one of theﬁrst policymeasures
pushing towards electric vehicles (Budde et al., 2012; Collantes and Sperling, 2008). It encompassed a
number of targets with regard to vehicle emissions as well as the market penetration of zero emission
vehicles. Though it was only limited to California it had a signiﬁcant impact on the US and the world.
More than 10% of the US vehicle market was in California (National Automobile Dealers Association,
2014), and policy developments in California often moved to other States. Although it triggered a
number of EV and FCEV prototypes being presented by the industry, it was then relaxed in 1996 as by
then the original goals were no longer expected to be met (Budde et al., 2012).
Despite this, the ZEV initiative inﬂuenced policy makers worldwide, also in terms of technology
choices (Budde et al., 2012, 2015). In the case of Germany, until the 1990s hydrogen fuel cell vehi-
cles had been favoured by the government resulting in substantial ﬁnding for hydrogen and fuel cell
research (Budde et al., 2012). As a result of the ZEV initiative, this changed and the interest diversiﬁed
to include other technologies such as batteries (Budde et al., 2012). Then around 1996/97, at a time
1 For mass media the study has focused on three major German quality newspapers, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung and Handelsblatt (ﬁnancial journal). For professional coverage we focused on the VDI Nachrichten, a journal for
engineers and technical management. Furthermore, we looked at media such as Autobild and Green Car Congress.
2 This included experts from the industry (BMW, Daimler, Audi) and experts from academia.
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Fig. 3. Timeline for BMW.
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Fig. 4. Timeline for Daimler.
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Fig. 5. Timeline for VW.
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Fig. 6. Daimler timeline outlining discussed activities.
Fig. 7. BMW timeline outlining discussed activities.
when hydrogen was not seen as a winner anymore (Der Spiegel, 1996), major OEMs in Germany and
Japan presented their respective solutions to dealwith the CO2 emission challenge. SurprisinglyDaim-
ler launched the Necar II hydrogen prototype, which triggered a new hydrogen/fuel cell hype, which
however was mainly limited to Germany. However, this was reﬂected by a hype in media coverage
that peaked in 2000/2001 (Konrad et al., 2012). At around the same time, hybrid vehicles such as the
Toyota Prius and the Honda Insight were launched on the Japanese and US markets (Høyer, 2008).
The early 2000s were dominated by global economic crisis that had some inﬂuence on the pro-
duction capacities and outputs of the automotive industry. So with regard to technology choices it
was not until 2004/05 that major changes occurred. Toyota’s success with the Prius hybrid vehicle
and the launch of its second generation started to put signiﬁcant pressure on the other automotive
players. This was magniﬁed by rising fuel prices. As a result, the changing perception of the hybrid
Fig. 8. VW timeline outlining discussed activities.
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Table 1
Identiﬁed technology/solution related activities of the German car manufacturers.
Daimler BMW VW
• Smart vehicle model launch • Work on fuel cells • 3 and 1L/100km vehicles
• Bluetec diesel initiative • Hydrogen combustion vehicles • Focus on alternative fuels
• Smart EVs ﬂeet trials • Engine efﬁciency improvements • Bluetec brand
• Battery production joint-venture • Mini EV trials • Bluemotion and downsizing
• Car sharing scheme Car2Go • i3 BEV and i8 PHEV launch • Porsche hybrids launch
• Electric B-Class vehicle launch • Carbon ﬁbre materials • Introduction of EVs
technology led to a ‘hybrid race’; this is testiﬁed by the signiﬁcant increase in patents of hybrid tech-
nologies, HEV/PHEV prototypes being presented at various automobile exhibitions, and numerous
announcements of HEV release dates (Budde et al., 2015). A wave of collaborations on these technolo-
gies among manufacturers and with suppliers could also be observed at the time (see timeline for the
three manufacturers).
During all that time, even with ups and downs, hydrogen fuel cell technology continued to enjoy
support fromvariousgovernment initiativesworldwide, suchas theUSDepartmentof Energy’sHydro-
genProgram.However, the inaugurationof StevenChuas thenewUSSecretaryunderPresidentObama
in 2009 together with a reassessment of all technology options triggered a major change in perception
of this technology. The US Hydrogen Program underwent major cuts and it was only the intervention
of the Congress that prevented it from being cancelled altogether (Bakker et al., 2012a,b).
During that time (2009–2012) the global ﬁnancial crisis hit, and governments in Germany, the UK,
the US and elsewhere launched a swathe of different national support programmes for the automotive
industry as part of broader economic stimulus packages, most of which had a technology focus. The
“Nationale Plattform Elektromobilität” in Germany (Bundesregierung und deutsche Industrie, 2010)
and the “Ultra Low Emission Vehicles initiative” in the UK (Department for Transport, 2012) had the
aim to support the uptake of electric mobility in order to reach both environmental and industrial
targets.
Since then, HEV/PHEVs and BEVs have dominated the debate while the hydrogen fuel cell technol-
ogy has seen less hype, such as in theUSWhite House Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future. In contrast,
the introduction of the TESLA Model S, Chevrolet Volt, Nissan Leaf, Mitsubishi iMiEV and many more
have kept battery technology ﬁrmly in the spotlight.
It is alsoworth noting that, despite the fact that post 2012/13 the focus is slowly shifting away again
from small, fuel efﬁcient vehicles towards bigger cars such as SUVs, PHEVs and BEVs still remain in the
car manufacturers’ technology portfolios as short- or medium-term solutions and are steadily gaining
momentum (see technologies in timelines),which suggests that a change in the current regimemaybe
occurring. This is also reﬂected by a continuous reduction of ﬂeet emissions of the threemanufacturers
studied here (based upon ﬂeet emissions reported in the annual reports of those companies).
3.2. The German car manufacturers
In this section the activities of the German carmanufacturers BMW,Daimler andVW in response to
various events are analysed. Following the analytical framework in Section 2, a set of micro-level key
activities related to low ﬂeet emission technologies and solutions has been outlined and then put into
relation with events that had happened at the automotive landscape and regime level. The analysis
resulted in the identiﬁcation of cases where activities on the micro-level were started, changed or
discontinued as a consequence of regime and landscape pressures (Table 1).
These activities and the corresponding events are summarised in Figs. 6–8. For each of the activities
outlined in Table 1 the following sections provide insights, in a narrative manner, into what triggered
them and the extent to which policy played a role by discussing what happened at that time or earlier
on the niche, regime and landscape levels.
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3.2.1. Daimler’s journey from the Necar I over Smart EVs to Tesla B-Classes
For a very long time Daimler was at the forefront of fuel cell research for automotive applica-
tion. It was the move of the company’s internal FC group from Dornier to the car section in the
early 1990s that allowed Daimler to develop a number of FC prototypes and demonstrator vehi-
cles. A few years later, in 1994 Daimler presented its ﬁrst FC prototype Necar I (New Electric Car
I), but it was the Necar II that would raise the proﬁle of FC vehicles at that time (Budde et al.,
2012).
Since that time Daimler has presented a variety of FC vehicles, including hybrids and versions
with gas reformers. A collaboration with Ballard in Canada led to the purchase of a stake in Ballard by
Daimler (togetherwith Ford) in 1997, and in2007 to the total acquisition of theBallard’s automotive FC
division. This meant that since the early 1990s Daimler had been accumulating substantial know-how
and R&D infrastructure in hydrogen fuel cells (Budde et al., 2012).
Around the millennium this had led to high expectations with regard to the commercial launch of
FCEVs. However, although Daimler announced in 1999 that there would be 100,000 FCEVs in 2004,
the application of the fuel cell technology never went beyond demonstrator programmes or small
series production (Budde et al., 2012). Even though at the end of the 1990s ﬂeet emission targets
started being discussed at the EU level, they only led to improvements of internal combustion engine
efﬁciencies.
In the early 1990s Daimler introduced the Smart brand, providing small and efﬁcient cars for the
urban environment. But this development was not an indirect effect of the California ZEV programme.
Instead the development and introduction of the Smart had been proposed and initiated by Swatch,
reﬂecting their vision of future mobility. In 1994 Daimler took over Volkswagen’s engagement in
Nicolas G. Hayek’s micro compact vehicle project, aiming to provide a small city vehicle (Die Zeit,
1994). The Smart fortwo, a small two seat vehicle was brought to market in 1998, but as Hayek’s
vision of a small and energy efﬁcient vehicle that could be used for car sharing had not been satisﬁed
nor shared by Daimler, Hayek decided to leave the joint venture and Daimler became sole owner of
Smart. Although Daimler launched a number of vehicles under the Smart brand, the initiative only
generated losses (Lewin, 2004; Steger et al., 2007; The New York Times, 1999).
However, the Smart brand contributed to decreasing Daimler’s average ﬂeet emissions, down to
around 180g CO2/km in 2005 from 230g CO2/km in 1995. At this point in time the disruptive change
(the Smart vehicle meant for Daimler the introduction of completely new distribution and supply
chains and the engagement with a new customer segment) from the view point of Daimler had been
induced by an external actor. But the company was not entirely backing this vision and pressures on
the landscape level were not strong enough. The impact of this project on Daimler’s direction was
negligible.
The same can be said about the Smart EV trials thatwere induced by actors external to the company
(Zytek Automotive, 2013). Being interested in gaining experience in the application of electric vehicle
technologies, the British company Zytek that was recently acquired by Continental had approached
Daimler (Zytek Automotive, 2014) and proposed and delivered the ﬁrst generations of the Smart EVs,
covering all expenses.
This development fell into a time (2004/05) when there was already signiﬁcant pressure on the
existing regime from the landscape level. There were consumer concerns about fuel costs, the effects
of carbon emissions as well as the discussion about legally binding ﬂeet emission targets. Also the
introduction of the second generation of the Toyota Prius Hybrid that was well received in the US
market put pressure on the entire automotive industry, including Daimler. Daimler however, only
respondedwith themarket introductionof incremental technologies such as start-stop, efﬁcient diesel
engines and mild hybrids. It also introduced, together with Volkswagen and GM, its Bluetec Diesel
branding (see timelines).
Although Daimler had already experienced pressures on the landscape level, it was the externally
induced Smart EV trials that provided a push towards the mass introduction of battery electric vehicle
technologies, a novelty for the company. This fell also in a time when a new CEO (2005) had been
appointed who launched signiﬁcant restructuring programmes. As a result, while past developments
had often ended in the presentation of concept vehicles only, these new developments (see Fig. 6)
ﬁnally led to a continuous journey towards different types of electric vehicle technologies.
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While the ﬁrst Smart electric vehicle components were still provided by Zytek Automotive (2013),
the newest generationswere using batteries, battery systems andmotors from subsidiaries that Daim-
ler created in the late 2000s. Together with Evonik, a specialist in chemicals, it formed a joint venture
for batteries, called ‘Li-tec’ and one for battery management systems (Handelsblatt, 2008), called
‘ACCUmotive’ (Handelsblatt, 2009), and with Bosch it formed a JV on electric motors, called ‘hubject
GmbH’ (Daimler, 2012). Before that, in 2009 Daimler bought stakes in TESLA, which supplied the bat-
teries for the 2nd generation of electric Smart vehicles (Spiegel Online, 2009a). To ensure economies
of scale for the JVs with Evonik, the batteries were also offered to other OEMs such as Renault/Nissan.
Furthermore, in the early 2010s Daimler announced a collaboration with Toyota in the domain of fuel
cells (Green Car Congress, 2010) and more collaborations with carbon and composite manufacturers.
At the time Daimler’s competitors were receiving signiﬁcant media coverage in relation to their
battery EVs, especially BMW with the i3 and i8 models and Tesla with the model S. Daimler had
to respond accordingly, relying again on external help. In parallel to the launch of the BMW i3 it
surprisingly launched an all-electric B-Class that slightly outperforms the i3 in range, price and size –
though it features an electric vehicle technology developed by Tesla (Green Car Congress, 2012).
To summarise the Daimler case, while pressures on the landscape level were always driving some
developments of battery, hybrid or fuel cell technology, in general there was no actual move to bring
them to the mass market. If work on technologies or solutions that were novel for the company were
started, then itmostly focused on incremental improvements based upon pastwork, such as that done
on engine efﬁciency improvements.
Disruptive change was brought about only by the appearance of external actors, as in the case of
Smart and Smart EV. These actors led to the introduction of novel technologies and vehicle segments.
But they could only succeed because there was already sufﬁcient pressure on the landscape level
backing these developments.
3.2.2. BMW’s journey from burning hydrogen in engines through project i to lightweight electric
vehicles
During the early 1990s BMW’s ZEV regulation-driven experiences with alternative vehicle propul-
sion technologieswereunsatisfactory, but in 1996 the companyestablished serioushydrogen research
activities. This happened at a time of hydrogen disappointment in the automotive sector (Der Spiegel,
1996). Daimler, BMW’s main competitor, had presented its Necar hydrogen fuel cell prototypes and
hence, instead of regulatory pressure it was the action of its main competitor which had led to the
establishing of a fuel cell research group (Budde et al., 2012). Furthermore, though research work
also focused on PEM fuel cells and later SOFC fuel cells, in 1998 BMW presented the 750hL, a large
executive sedan that was not powered by fuel cells but instead burned the hydrogen in a conventional
combustion engine. The vehicle only featured a 5kW fuel cell that was used as auxiliary power unit
for various electronic systems in the vehicle (VDI Nachrichten, 2010).
Since then, BMW built a small series of more than 100 of these hydrogen combustion engine
vehicles. These were used at various events (Spiegel Online, 2001), such as the World Exhibition in
2000 in Germany and a number of demonstrator programmes where the vehicles proved themselves
running for a total of over 4,000,000km. A petrol fuelled car that used a solid oxide fuel cell auxiliary
power unit was also presented. The fuel for the fuel cell was obtained by reformation of the petrol. But
these vehicles were not a move towards new technologies as they still relied on combustion engines
– these solutions were still part of the existing regime. On the other hand, using fuel cells to deliver
power to the electronics of the car was a way for BMW to gain knowledge in the application of this
technology.
However, the above-mentioned vehicles never reached the market. Although there were discuss-
ions about ﬂeet emission targets at the EU level and BMW announced in 2002 that it would bring
its hydrogen combustion vehicle to market (Auto Bild, 2002), this never went beyond the status of
demonstrator. There was no attempt yet by BMW to bring novel vehicle electriﬁcation technologies to
production. Moreover, since the beginning of the 2000s, BMW focused its efforts on the introduction
of a variety of engine efﬁciency improvements and on thewider use of diesel in the ﬂeet, both ofwhich
led to a slow but steady decrease in average ﬂeet emissions – an incremental solution. Furthermore,
hybrid and electric vehicle development at BMW did not intensify over this period of time. BMW did
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not attempt a disruptive change of their vehicle propulsion technology, nor was this even mentioned
in the company’s annual reports.
This changed in 2005/06, coincidingwith the success of Toyota’s Prius and rising fuel prices, causing
customers to demand similar solutions (Der Spiegel, 2005). Until then, only hydrogen combustion
technology featured in the annual reports as a future solution for low emission vehicles. In contrast
to that, from 2005/06 onwards, hybrid vehicle technology started to feature in the annual reports
as well. Around that time, collaboration with GM and Daimler–Chrysler was announced in order to
develop a hybrid system to compete with the Japanese manufacturers. Additionally, in 2006/2007
BMW intensiﬁed its hydrogen combustion vehicle activities by leasing out 100 vehicles to the public
andwith incremental improvements such as the recuperation of energy to its lead acid battery (Spiegel
Online, 2006b). Still, BMWdid not provide any real hybrid vehicle solution. It continued to concentrate
on the technologies it was familiar with – the internal combustion engine and its efﬁciency - and this,
in spite of the increasing pressure on the landscape level created by discussions on mandatory CO2
ﬂeet emissions standards in the European Union to replace the existing voluntary agreements.
However, after the selection of a new CEO in 2006, in 2007 (a very successful year for BMW, with
no signs of the ﬁnancial crisis yet to come) BMW initiated ‘project i’ under its so-called ‘number
ONE strategy’. This project was launched to review the future technology options. It was this project
that triggered a signiﬁcant change in the long-term technology strategy of BMW with disruptive
consequences on its technology choices (BMW Group, 2009; Spiegel Online, 2013a).
Shortly after the review had ﬁnished, BMW stopped the hydrogen combustion vehicle programme
that it had been promoting for so many years and instead announced a series of changes (FOCUS,
2009), including the launch of a Mini EV trial ﬂeet, collaboration with SB LiMotive on batteries and the
creation of a Joint Venture with PSA (Peugeot/Citroen).
The results from these trials led in 2010 to the announcement that BMW was planning to develop
and produce a BEV for the mass market. BMW’s announcement meant that the company was now
embarking on a journey towards electric vehicles (Der Spiegel, 2010).
In the early 2010s, after a number of competitors brought their PHEVs and BEVs to market, BMW
presented its Megacity Vehicle (BMW i3), a small lightweight BEV vehicle built in Leipzig that was
commercialised at the end of 2013 (Der Spiegel, 2010). With an entirely new production plant built
to produce the i3, BMW has clearly committed to this technology.
During2011 theacquisitionof SGLCarbon, the supplier of lightweightmaterials for the i3and i8was
alsoannounced (SpiegelOnline, 2011,2013a). In2012/2013, a timewhenthenumberofHEVs/PHEVs in
BMW’sportfoliowas limited, BMWalsoagreed to collaboratewithToyotaon fuel cell systems, lithium-
air batteries, lightweight technologies and the electriﬁcation of vehicles (Spiegel Online, 2012).
To summarise theBMWcase (see Fig. 7),while pressures on the landscape levelwere alwaysdriving
some developments of vehicle electriﬁcation technologies; there was no actual move to bring them to
the mass market until the introduction of a new CEO in 2006. Most of the work focused on the known
internal combustion engine technology – only the fuel being replaced with hydrogen. It can therefore
be stated that the concept and trial vehicles were still largely based upon ‘past’ knowledge.
Despite the signiﬁcant pressure at regime level brought by the success of the Prius hybrid vehicle
and the serious discussions of mandatory ﬂeet emission standards, it was not until the ‘project i’ was
initiated and a review of BMW’s long-term technology strategy conducted, triggered by the appoint-
ment of the new CEO, that BMW decided to focus on lightweight and battery vehicle technologies
(BMW Group, 2009). The company has since embarked on a path towards a disruptive change of their
technology and product portfolio.
3.2.3. VW’s steady path meeting emission limits
Even thoughVWexecuted some trials onEVs, PHEVsandFCvehicles in the1990s, its vehiclepropul-
sion technology research was mainly focussed on highly efﬁcient combustion engines and especially
diesel engines, as well as the use of bio fuels. While BMW and Daimler had presented their solu-
tions for low emission transport, VW presented its Lupo 3L with a fuel consumption of 3l/100km
in 1998 (Der Spiegel, 1998), followed in 2002 by the announcement of a 1 L vehicle (Spiegel Online,
2002), that was not introduced to market at that time. This work was strongly supported by the CEO
who had a background in combustion technology and especially diesel engine engineering. However,
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development of the vehicles was soon scrapped due to low demand (similar to what had happened
to the Audi A2) before 2005 (Spiegel Online, 2005b). In comparison to BMW and Daimler, VW made
fewer public announcements with regards to alternative vehicle concepts.
During 2005 the success of the Prius and rising fuel prices coincided with the creation of the
collaborative brand Bluetec for Diesel combustion engine vehicles – together with Daimler and GM
(Spiegel Online, 2006a). It can be seen that during these times VW was still sticking to its traditional,
internal combustion engine based products.
Similar to its German competitors, VW reacted to the success of the Prius in the late 2000s with
the development of low emission engines. This led very early on to the development of downsized
engines such as the 1.4 litre TSI turbocharged that won Engine Awards for 7 consecutive years since
2006 (Green Car Congress, 2013; Spiegel Online, 2005a). The micro vehicle up!, which is similar to
the Smart fortwo but a four-seater, was introduced in 2009 (Spiegel Online, 2009b). Furthermore, the
1 L vehicle project was re-launched again in 2007 (Green Car Congress, 2007), leading to a number of
prototypes, with the last one in 2013 called XL1 Super Efﬁcient (Spiegel Online, 2013b). In addition to
that VW pursued the development of biofuels and launched its own production facilities in the early
2010s.
Until recently, no signiﬁcant changes in technology could be observed, despite the mandatory
emission regulations introduced in the EU. This is explained by the fact that, unlike the rest of the
German manufacturers, these policies were less of a threat to VW as it had historically served the
market with smaller vehicles. As a result VW has always been on track towards meeting average ﬂeet
emissions targets (120g CO2/km by 2015 and 95g CO2/km by 2020). As a result, regulation did not
create sufﬁciently strong pressure to introduce disruptive vehicle electriﬁcation technologies such as
EVs at VW. However, VW has recently started to develop EV concepts such as the EV ‘VW up!’, which
was introduced in 2014, probably responding to the electric vehicle activities of its competitors.
It is worth noting that within the VW family it is Porsche that ﬁrst started work on electric propul-
sion in 2007 (Spiegel Online, 2007), developing hybrid vehicles in response to the request for ‘green’
SUVs from its customers, collaborating with Sanyo in Li-ion batteries and Continental for the delivery
of the necessary components (Green Car Congress, 2009).
To summarise (see Fig. 8), VW’s technology choice of highly efﬁcient diesel technology had been
able to satisfy landscape pressures such as emission regulations and high fuel costs. Therefore in
contrast with the other manufacturers it is difﬁcult to identify a signiﬁcant move towards electric
vehicle technology yet. However, there are recent signs that VW has ﬁnally taken this step, although
the exact reasons are hard to infer yet.
4. Conclusion
This study has examined on amicro-levelwhat has inﬂuenced the low emission vehicle technology
related activities of the three main German car manufacturers. Based upon the analytical framework
chosen (see Fig. 1), major changes in the activities of these ﬁrms that went far beyond business-as-
usualwere identiﬁed and thenput in relation towhat had beenhappening at the regime and landscape
level at that time. The goal was to identify triggers for these activities.
To summarise, the analysis has led to the following insights.
For all three manufacturers, activities related to niche technologies that were new to them only
occurred when actively introduced by external actors such as collaborators or induced by internally
disruptive events such as newCEOs. This is in linewith the ﬁnding by earlier studies (Benn et al., 2006;
Howell and Higgins, 1990; Howell et al., 2005) that ‘innovation champions’ or ‘change agents’ play an
important role with regard to disruptive changes.
However, in order for change agents to initiate niche related activities, the presence of sufﬁcient
pressure at the regime and landscape level is a necessary condition. One example of such pressure is
already the discussion of mandatory ﬂeet CO2 emission targets to replace the automotive industry’s
voluntary agreements. As already found by earlier studies (Budde et al., 2012; Konrad et al., 2012;
Wesseling et al., 2013), in the absence of signiﬁcant external pressures the German car manufacturers
did not seek niche technologies. Such pressure, where present, can also be created by consumers’
demands and the success of competitors.
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Moreover we ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of regulatory policy on the selection of particular disruptive
technologies by the automotive industry is limited. Policy programmes that were supporting one
speciﬁc niche technology did not make all three car manufacturers work on this one technology but
instead they continued to work on the technologies that were familiar to them. The industry by itself
determines the path or technology they choose and this can differ across companies even though they
are part of the same socio-technical system. All three German players studied were affected by the
same trends and policies – still, they came up with different technology solutions. And on the world
scale, Toyota had chosen hybrids; Nissan, Tesla and BMW went for battery electric vehicles; and now,
Toyota is moving back towards fuel cells – a solution which Daimler is moving away from, in favour
of battery electric vehicles. Clearly there is no obvious winner yet.
Finally, it appears that, in the absence of external or internal change agents, car manufac-
turers typically respond to regime and landscape pressures such as ﬂeet emission regulations
with incremental technologies created through the combination of internally available solu-
tions.
Although the observations we have made in our study are general in nature and the sample on
which they are based is relatively limited, the results still provide valuable insight into the effect that
government policy has on the automotive industry – and what limitations exist. Our observations
make it clear that in the case where a transition that requires a signiﬁcant alignment of the regime
is favoured by policy makers, the creation of policy incentives or pressures on the landscape level
might not be enough to induce such an alignment due to the existing circumstances of the individ-
ual actors and organisations. The internal conditions at these companies might not be supporting
such a change, either due to lack of internally available knowledge or the lack of support within the
organisation.
This does not mean that policy making is obsolete. It might not inﬂuence what particular technolo-
gies (combustion engine efﬁciency, lightweight materials, BEV, PHEV or FCEV) a company will choose
in the end, but it can create landscape conditions – or pressures – that support the work of internal
change agents whose disruptive propositions are more likely to be accepted. Hence under the right
conditions niche related activities become less of a disturbance to the company’s status quo and more
of a welcomed solution.
To conclude, we propose that policy makers should ensure that the industry (that often has already
chosen and often is already developing a certain technology) is supported in its efforts to gain a
competitive advantage with their chosen solution. Therefore, ﬁnancial support should not have the
purpose to push the industry towards a certain technology over others, but instead, for example for
being technology neutral, it should support the R&D of the disruptive technologies that the industry
itself selects. At the same time it is essential that policy makers should maintain the non-ﬁnancial
policies such as regulations and standards that create the landscape conditions that destabilise the
regime if it does not support the ultimate policy goals in terms of fuel efﬁciency and emission reduc-
tion.
With regards to the presented framework, it has to be mentioned that different interpretations
are possible due to the nature of the MLP and especially the soft boundaries between its different
levels. Still, although the MLP is perceived to have a number of limitations (Geels, 2011), it provides a
useful framework for a structured discussion of the way, in which micro-level activities contribute to
transitions.
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